ASEAN’s Pragmatism: A Short Answer to Why ASEAN Has Survived

It will be argued in this essay that while the creation and endurance of ASEAN may have been contrary to Realist views, the organisation can be perceived as very much a product of Realist pragmatism. In addition, the organisation’s successes have been a product of this pragmatism, where the internal political and cultural systems of each country is highly respected, in contrast to the high level of legal-bureaucratic integration between the countries of the European Union.

The Paradox of ASEAN

It is a common Realist perception that all states, regardless of internal dynamics, are imprisoned by the unavoidable imperative of seeking more power (Baylis et al., 2020). By this logic it follows that an international organisation such as ASEAN would be quite an anomaly in the international system. The ten states of ASEAN are of diverse cultural heritage and political situations. Additionally, many people do not quite realise the sheer plurality of Southeast Asia, where around seven-hundred million people of different faiths, cultures, economic and political systems live as neighbours. With this in mind, it should not be a surprise to find that these countries all have different approaches to foreign policy. What then, was it that led to these states coming together in the form of ASEAN?

The Formation of ASEAN

To begin, it is worthwhile to understand how ASEAN was created. Once, my honourable professor said that it is, more often than not, geography, which dictates the foreign policy of a state. And so, it can be seen that the creation of ASEAN was as very much a matter of geography, where the five founding members of ASEAN - Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand found themselves in a volatile international environment and so found it wise to cooperate with one another as goodwilled neighbours. ASEAN was founded by these neighbours in 1967 with the loosely worded five-paged Bangkok Declaration. However, it must be understood that these neighbours were in a tangled mess that was Cold War politics.

Cold War Drama

The founding of ASEAN itself can be seen as irregular and unlikely. Just years prior to 1967, Indonesia was politically opposed to the formation of the federation of Malaysia. In 1965, Singapore was bitterly separated from Malaysia. The Philippines were also against the political integration of northern Borneo into Malaysia. Meanwhile, all of this was happening in the backdrop of the Cold War, where the Vietnam War, was raging concurrently to the founding of ASEAN (Chalk, 2015). This puts the creation of ASEAN in the late 1960s at odds with the development of the European Union, where Europe had more cultural and economic cohesion and a more defined role in the mess of Cold War politics as opposed to the recently de-colonised and volatile region of Southeast Asia.

Whether the founding of ASEAN was a defensive reaction to the Cold War or a genuine attempt to bring together the peoples of the region is subject to debate. But to Realists, the creation of ASEAN may be thought of as counterintuitive to those five founding states, who had reasons and reservations not to create such an organisation.

On the Question of Defence

The question remains: why is it that these states, who may have had differing foreign policy interests, and especially in matters of national and regional security, decided to establish as an organisation? That is unless, the formation of ASEAN would instead be some form of a collective security arrangement to the benefit of the founding states. However, ASEAN is obviously not designed as such.

Regarding the issue of regional security, the Bangkok Declaration and other founding documents, such as the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia expressed a desire to free the region from external interference by great powers, despite this, that is certainly not the case when it comes to the security arrangements of individual states. For instance, both Malaysia and Singapore have defence agreements with the United Kingdom. And so, it is argued that the success of ASEAN comes not from a collective desire to create some form of a defensive arrangement but from ASEAN’s unique process of facilitating dialogue between member states distanced from direct matters of defence and regional security while addressing those issues as well in a specialised format in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

As such, it is inaccurate to say that the problem of security is foreign to ASEAN. In fact, it is very much the opposite. After the conclusion of the Cold War, the ASEAN Regional Forum was established in 1994 to provide a much-needed space for dialogue both between ASEAN member states and regional great powers such as China, Japan and the United States. Such a forum is the first of its kind in the Asia-Pacific region, (Moon, n.d.). Since its conception, the ARF has proved to be a valued ‘neutral space’ to discuss security issues for countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea.

Thus, it can be perceived that the success of ASEAN in matters of regional security lies very much in its fluidity. It is plainly because ASEAN was never designed to be a form of collective security arrangement which encourages the participation of individual states which have their own security arrangements. As such, from a Realist perspective, ASEAN’s formation and durability reflects political pragmatism practiced by the participating countries.

The Way Things Are Done Here

Moving on, what can explain the endurance and effectiveness of ASEAN in non-security issues? Many people of past decades have predicted that ASEAN as an organisation is either bound to fade into irrelevance or ASEAN as being critically ineffective from the start. But evidence suggests the opposite, where the ‘ASEAN way’ of loose transnational consultation and consensus has paved the way for great progress in facilitating peace and cooperation between member states who would not otherwise be so engaged should under a heavily legally institutionalised structure like the European Union.

Here, similar to matters of security, pragmatism can be offered as a reason. Evidence of Realist rationale can be seen in the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which explicitly affirms the inviolability of each member state’s sovereignty and national identity. Interference into a country's internal affairs is also forbidden. It is by setting ground rules like these which makes ASEAN a more abled organisation for diplomacy between member states, who value quiet diplomacy and closed-door meetings.

This puts ASEAN in contrast to the supranational character of the European Union where national borders are comparatively more blurred and cross-border political interactions more obvious and scrutinised. Additionally, ASEAN is also enabled by the comparatively less bureaucratic nature of the organisation, an instance of this can be seen in the length of the Charter, which stands at around forty pages, much shorter than the one-hundred- and twenty-six-page Maastricht Treaty, which formally established the European Union.

In other words, while the incredible legal-bureaucratic integration of the European Union can be seen as directly beneficial to the region, it seems that ASEAN is successful plainly because of the fact that it is not based on a culture of red tape or intergovernmental bureaucracy.

Conclusion

ASEAN is very much successful due to its pragmatic structure. Despite the many challenges faced by ASEAN since 1967, such as the failure to prevent intra-state conflicts and tensions within the region, the organisation has nonetheless survived and has effectively functioned due to its pragmatic structure where minimal institutionalisation serves as a key to fostering cooperation both within and outside of the region. As Kishore Mahbubani once phrased it, ASEAN is a ‘Living, Breathing Modern Miracle’ (Mahbubani, 2015). And so, while the existence of ASEAN may seem against the logic of Realists, it can be argued that it is very much built and sustained on Realist principles of non-interference and pragmatism.

References

Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2020). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (9th ed.). Oxford University Press.

Chalk, P. (2015). The institutional development of ASEAN. In ASEAN ascending: Achieving ‘centrality’ in the emerging Asian order (pp. 9–12). Australian Strategic Policy Institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04212.6

Mahbubani, K. (2015). ASEAN As A Living, Breathing Modern Miracle. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, 2, 136–149. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48573461 Notes: Mahbubani goes into detail the specifics of ASEAN’s structural appeal and its uniqueness.

Moon, C. (n.d.). ASEAN Regional Forum | Asian organisation. Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/ASEAN-Regional-Forum

Lew Wei Yang (Mark) is a student of International Relations, a discipline he approaches with deep engagement and a recognition of its critical relevance in today’s world. His academic focus is centered on the evolving geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. Mark advocates for a strategic Malaysian foreign policy that adapts to the volatility of great power competition, specifically regarding the vested interests of the US, China, and Japan.

He holds a strong conviction that Malaysia is poised to leverage its standing among developing Southeast Asian nations to amplify its influence. Mark believes the path forward lies in robust multilateralism and cultural diplomacy, and he is encouraged by the strides the nation is currently making in these areas.

Beyond his diplomatic interests, Mark is an avid reader of fiction and non-fiction and a writer. His appreciation for the arts is eclectic, ranging from the thrillers and comedies of cinema to a deep love for music. He draws inspiration from the cross-genre versatility of Billy Joel, as well as the classical compositions of Beethoven and Chopin. In his leisure time, he enjoys karaoke, walking, and creative doodling.